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AFRICOM commander Gen. Carter F. Ham recently touted the old line that there are links between militant Islamist group al-Shabaab and piracy, but there is little evidence to support such assertions and the actions of the group seem to point in the opposite direction.
Ham can be excused, since the General has been in the AFRICOM saddle less than a month, but US policy heads commonly drop in a casual mention about the link between piracy and terrorism. Johnnie Carson mentioned that piracy was becoming a transnational problem when he discovered that Yemenis were among the pirates who killed the four American yachtsmen on the SV Quest. He seems to have forgotten the proximity and common linkages between mariners of both neighboring nations.
Despite quips that seem to convey confirmation of “the third rail”, Ham has his sights on the right target.
“There has to be a whole-government approach,” he said, “to deal with their finances and to deal with their activities on shore.”
Carson also has a firm grip on the realities of the Somali situation by pulling back from the TFG and engaging more-successful, less-time consuming political partners in the troubled country. But these off-hand comments seem to be attempts to tie ideological, political or religious terrorism to a crime that is driven purely by profit.
Evidence thin on the ground
The most “conclusive” evidence of an al-Shabaab was presented in December of 2009, when Canadian Intelligence was convinced the group was arming and training pirates in exchange for a slice of the pie.
The Top Secret report by Integrated Threat Assessment Centre maintained that there was a “Islamist extremism-piracy nexus” with al-Shabaab providing “weapons, combat training and local protection” to the Mudug pirates of southern Somalia. In exchange, al-Shabaab was to receive a percentage of the ransoms.
The concept is questionable considering that the locations, skillset and purpose of piracy requires very specific maritime hostile-boarding skills, coastal access and sailing history (al-Shabaab recruits primary from inland camps and southern areas) and also patient ransom negotiation skills with insurance companies or ship owners. Sure, some pirate new hires may have learned how to shoot a gun in al-Shabaab camps, but they can get the same training from the TFG, Puntland Marines, foreign countries and other training programs. The ideology does not transfer, even if the skills do.
Al-Shabaab is neither a maritime-based group nor do its leaders knows anything about the dark secrets of negotiating ransoms with insurance companies. This skill was nurtured in Bosasso during a maritime security training program that fell apart in 2000. If al-Shabaab had these skills, and evidence could be presented, it would make the venerable British maritime insurance providers direct supporters of terrorists and subject to numerous financial, travel and criminal sanctions.
The rumor of links between pirates and terrorists first surfaced in 2008, when al-Shabaab demanded weapons from the hijacked MV FAINA and were rebuffed, then again in 2009 upon the release of a Jane’s Defense report. It also came up in 2010 when al-Shabaab tried to take over Haradhere, but were repelled. In September 2010, Sheikh Mahad Omar Abdikarim, head of Bay and Bakool regions, was reported to have made a call for a “sea jihad” and called upon fighters to attack American ships.
"We have to retaliate against them by sea or by land,” an anonymous source quoted him as saying.
Residents of Kismayo and Barawe insist they saw armed al-Shabaab fighters heading out to sea. Six months later, the lack of any action or proof makes the story seem as foolish as it originally sounded.
Al-Shabaab's supposed slice of the pie
But back to the genesis of this rumor. It comes from no other than Ambassadorial level. Specifically, the very experienced Ambassador David Shinn, now an adjunct professor at the Elliot School of International Affairs at Washington University. It appears that Ambassador Shin ignored his many years in Somalia and adopted this report in a number of Somalia-related public presentations.
He insisted in his speeches that al-Shabaab requires pirates to pay a protection fee of 5 to 10 per cent of any ransom money collected. Additionally, he maintains that if al-Shabaab helps to train the pirates, they receive 20 per cent. He goes on to say that al-Shabaab's share can be as high as 50 per cent if they financed the operation.
These “facts” actually comes from a Jane’s Defense Weekly report, and in reality Ambassador Shinn does not believe there is a direct link between the two groups. His exact quote is: “Let me begin with two caveats. First, all of my information comes from open sources; those of you with access to classified information on this subject may be disappointed with some of the lacunae in my presentation. The best open source reporting I have seen on this topic comes from Jane’s Intelligence Review.”
In the same speech, the ambassador claims a reverse connection: that the pirates actually provide weapons to al-Shabaab using their Yemeni connections: “There is increasing evidence that the pirates are assisting al-Shabaab with arms smuggling from Yemen and two central Asian countries.”
In January of this year Vice Adm. Mark Fox , commander of the Navy’s Bahrain-based Central Command fleet, stated that "al-Shabaab is responsible for a lot of training activity and camps and that sort of thing in Somalia.”
He neatly broke piracy in to eight “action groups”, each with a mother ship and pirates.
“There cannot be segregation between terrorist activity, in my mind, and counter-piracy. We can't be passive and hopeful it doesn't happen. I’m not advocating we suddenly just come out with guns blazing and just change everything,” said Fox. “But I would advocate that we used the same techniques that have been successful in our counter-terror that we have not heretofore used in our counter-piracy.”
Thankfully he does point out that piracy is currently being treated as a law- enforcement activity.
It would appear that the pirates and al-Shabaab are everywhere.
Insurgent group most-effective piracy deterrent
The reality is that local militias like Ali Osman Atto provide land security and the few weapons that are needed by pirates (they are usually rusted and old) are shipped and purchased through the al-Shabaab controlled port in Kismayo.
The real relationship is best defined by the April 8, 2011 attack on Haradhere by al-Shabaab, which drove the pirates north to Hobyo. Those pirates that didn’t flee were arrested by the Islamic group. Al-Shabaab views the pirates as corrosive to their main source of income, which is the port taxes and shipment of goods in Kismayo. The pirates view al-Shabaab as the third rail that will bring down the wrath of America’s well-oiled terrorist killing machine.
The truth is that al-Shabaab has been the only effective land-based deterrent to piracy and the one group that has actively driven them out of pirate ‘dens’ like Haradhere. Not only have they forced the pirates to move their ships far north of Kismayo and Mogadishu, but they have arrested at least 50 pirates in Haradhere - a direct contrast to more apocryphal media stories about al-Shabaab demanding that they have at least two fighters on every pirate ship to ensure fair payment.
Opposing goals
Does al-Shabaab get money from pirates? Yes and no. Al-Shabaab is a divided, diverse group that holds sway in the vacuum of any functioning Somalia government. There can be no doubt that at some point pirate money crosses al- Shabaab hands. But does al-Shabaab dictate, control or fund piracy? Somalia Report has seen no evidence of this, and believes that the two groups are mutually toxic to each other’s existence. The insurgents exist to rid Somalia of outsiders, criminals and western influence. Pirates rely on outsiders, criminals and western influence.
We continue to investigate, probe and keep an open mind, but to date we have found no proof of piracy linked with al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab or terrorism. Could the act of piracy be redefined as a terrorist act? Possibly, since the mass kidnapping of innocent multinationals and now the murder of four Americans is terror, but no political, ideological or religious demands have ever been made by pirates. They want money. Pure and simple.
Then there is the very real threat that any hard linkage of piracy to terrorism could unleash the full impact of the US anti-terrorism forces in the region. The US has not been shy about shelling, bombing, shooting and hunting down anyone linked to al-Qaeda. For now, the pundits' favorite fantasy of supertankers being steered by khat-addled suicidal jihadis is still in the realm of Hollywood scriptwriters.
Al-Shabaab not invited to the party
Piracy can only survive as a embarrassingly amoral relationship between ransom payers and ship takers. Each party dutifully maintains a false sense of purpose to condone their acts. The pirates insist they are protecting the seas and the insurance companies insist they are ensuring the safe delivery of crew, ship and cargo. But they both make profits by dancing with the devil. Al-Shabaab has not been invited onto the dance floor.