On Saturday, at the end of the conference, the Garowe Agreement was signed by Somali president Sharif Sheikh Ahmed along with prime minister Abdiwali Mohamed Ali, acting speaker of parliament Sharif Hassan, the president of Puntland Abdirahman Sheikh Mohamed Farole, the president of Galmudug Mohamed Ahmed Aalim and representatives from the pro-government wing of Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaah.
The Garowe Principles, which are planned to guide Somalia’s political and constitutional development for coming years, address the reform of the Somali parliament, the formation of national Constituent Assembly of 1,000 members to vote on a federal constitution and also building new federal government based on the '4.5' clan formula.
Somalia Report analyst Muhyadin Ahmed Roble spoke with Professor Abdurahman A. Baadiyow, PhD in Modern Islamic history from McGill University and the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Mogadishu University, Somalia. Prof Baadiyoow, who has participated in the Somali reconciliation conferences since 2000 and remains close to the political dynamics in Somalia, said that the signing of principles is good, but insufficient if the implementation process is not seen as fair and transparent, capable of producing legitimate national institutions.
Muhyadin: Has the Garowe conference concluded with an agreement which can satisfy Somalis?Prof Baadiyoow: We have to look at the Garowe conference as a successor to the Mogadishu Consultative Conference for the implementation of the Road Map, as a vital milestone in creating new environment for furthering Somali dialogue within its own country. Holding conferences in Somalia is an important and positive development which bridges relations between the TFIs and Puntland regional state. However, the Transitional Parliament was in conflict and I think that situation may reflect negatively on the spirit of the conference. Moreover, there is deep suspicion of the mechanism and the process of implementing signed principles in Growe. There is a need to make this mechanism transparent and distant from the monopoly of the signed individuals. The other relevant question is whether the agreed principles are final, or they will be included in proposed provisional constitution and will they be debated and reviewed by constituent assembly and the parliament?
Muhyadin:Is there something which is unique or different about the Garowe agreement, from previous Somali conferences and agreements?
Prof Baadiyoow: There is nothing substantially unique about the Garowe conference. It is a replica of the vocabulary of Djibouti conference which was driven by civil society in 2000. The Djibouti conference was later manipulated by the armed groups (Kenya 2004 and Djibouti in 2009). In the 2000 conference, basic mechanisms and processes for traditional power sharing democracy were established which suit the Somali society in the absence of organized political parties. The formula of '4.5' was adopted, and institutions were built based on that formula.
Muhyadin: If you read the principles, will the Somalis find what they have been looking for the last twenty years?
Prof Baadiyoow: As I have said earlier, the signed principles are not new, but a positive shift from the empowering armed groups who have hijacked Somali reconciliation conferences since 2004, returning to a community-led process similar to the 2000 conference in Djibouti. Moreover, the signing of principles is good, but is not enough if implementation process is not seen as fair and transparent capable of producing legitimate national institutions. Somalis are looking for representative and effective government competent of restoring their dignity and statehood, after more than 20 years since the state collapsed in 1991.
Muhyadin: As the Garowe principles read, 225 MPs (currently 550 MPs) based on the '4.5' formula for power-sharing, will be elected next August and a new chamber of Elders will be introduced. The number of new chamber is unclear so what your recommendation?
Prof Baadiyoow: I think that the 225 MPs was the smallest number of the MPs that clans have divided among themselves following the 4.5 formula in 2000 (additional 20 were added later). The Kenya conference of 2004 agreed on 275 MPs and the second Djibouti conference of 2009 doubled the number to 550 MPs. I think 225 is quite good because it is less conflictual and suitable in the era of reconciliation because it has historical precedence and clans have already divided among themselves. With respect in creating a new chamber of elders, the concept is not bad, however how to introduce it and what will be the role and numbers is very crucial. I hope the number the House of Elders will not be more than 1/3 of the Parliament. The House of Elders also have to include prominent Somalis who have contributed to the welfare of the people academically, economically and socially. The answer for the question of who will select members of the House of Elders remains contentious and unanswered.
Muhyadin: Despite the current infighting among the parliament, can the parliament enact reforms before August?
Prof Baadiyoow: If the remaining role of the parliament is to approve the new interim constitution, become part of the constituent assembly and dissolve itself to give the room for the selection of the new members of the parliament; then it is possible to achieve it within the period before August 2012. There is a need, however, for internal reconciliation among MPs and other state institutions to restore normal functioning.
Muhyadin: The Somalia constitution will be voted on by 1,000 delegates in June rather than national referendum, what can we expect from such vote?
Prof Baadiyoow: Most likely they will approve the interim constitution which was processed through various stages. I also think that a national referendum is not possible in the current conditions. This, the only option available is to call for constituent assembly that represent Somalis: clans, regions, diaspora, men and women, business community and professionals.
Muhyadin: Can these 1,000 delegates be considered as representative of the Somali community?
Prof Baadiyoow: It seems that the number is very small and minimizes representations. I would have recommended inviting the number which is about three time of the current parliament (550x4=2200). The criteria for selecting participants are very crucial and must include personalities across the social, economical, educational and political spectrum. The participation of the Somali diaspora is also vital. If the current leadership attempts, as expected, to control the outcome by controlling the participants, then the process will be illegitimate and lead to conflict.
Muhyadin: The agreement emphasizes the 4.5 formula, how will such power-sharing deal hurt the minorities? Isn’t it unfair to them?
Prof Baadiyoow: If we are looking at international standard, the 4.5 power sharing formula is unfair for all Somalis, not only for the minorities. It is because it is based on imaginary numbers, ghettoizing Somali citizens into primordial clans and denying the freedom of choice of the citizens. However in the Somali context, the most important thing is to reach some agreement between communities experiencing civil war. Hence, the importance of 4.5 should be considered as an agreed-upon model, not as fair representation. The indepth analysis of the 4.5 formula shows that it has empowered minority subclans within each four majority clans and offered alliances of the so-called smaller clans (there is no statistical data to back the claim of small and majority clans) substantial seats in the parliament, which they otherwise possibly not have acquired in free and fair elections. Therefore, the 4.5 formula will be only abolished in one person-one vote election -- until then, so far, there is no agreeable alternative in Somalia.
Muhyadin: The 4.5 formula is not new to Somalis, but the question is whether such a government can function effectively?
Prof Baadiyoow: The functionality of the government is not necessarily dependent on the 4.5 formula. It depends on the quality of leadership in the top echelons of state hierarchy. It depends on the level of their commitment for the rule of law and accountability. It depends on how national ideals are revived. It depends on how committed the international community are to assisting Somalia to recover and rebuild itself. The 4.5 formula should be transformed within the parliament by creating parliamentary caucuses instead of clan groupings. It requires prudent political arrangement, transformational leaderships and the will of the MPs.
Muhyadin: Where is Somalia going before August 2012?
Prof Baadiyoow: Today Somalia is the worst place on earth. It is a symbol of famine, terrorism, piracy, corruption and the longest failed state on earth. However, the history of Somalia gives us a different picture. Somalia was the symbol of democracy in Africa and was the country that strongly supported African liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and many others. Somali people demonstrated unprecedented resilience after the collapse of the state. Therefore Somalia has enough potential to face the challenges of statehood. I think therefore there will be many dialogues, discussions, conflicts and finally some form of agreements will be reached. The new political dispensation will attract new political forces and potential leaders. New generation of leadership will emerge to participle in shaping new Somalia. If the process does not offer an opportunity for fair participation and current leadership or foreign actors hijack the process, I expect the “Arab spring” will be extended to Somalia. The younger generation of educated Somalis will not accept the continuation of the status quo. They believe in change and people power, and will shape the new Somalia, sooner or later.
Muhyadin: You said in your recent article that the ‘Roadmap’ will lead to another division of Somali people, what do you mean by this?
Prof Baadiyoow: I do not mean the Roadmap as a direction to end the transition, but how the process was articulated in the political circles during the time of writing the article. I still do mean that it will cause division of the people if the Road Map is implemented in unfair way. It will eventually create more conflict and empower extremist elements and anti-state groups. Added to that, there will be possibilities of forming new armed opposition groups to the government. Therefore we should be aware that Somalia yearns for fairness, participation, legitimacy and to own its own destiny. Any diversion from that path will eventually produce negative consequences.
Muhyadin: How can Somalis and the world deal with the tribal and clan mentality that makes national unity difficult?
Prof Baadiyoow: Tribalism is not the major problem in Somalia, as many scholars have entertained for long years and political leadership has used this discourse to diverting Somalis from their real problem. The real problem is failing to abide by rules and regulations. Tribalism, ethnic belonging and interest groups are worldwide phenomenon, why is the Somali type exceptional? Somalis have to learn to abide by their national laws and regulations, in particular if it does not contradict with the Islamic Shari’a. They have to establish strong institutions that safeguard the rule of law. Tribalism in Somalia is not worse than similar tribalism in other Africa countries, and focusing on it is misreading and misrepresentation of Somalia. A clear example is other parts of Somalia: Somaliland and Puntland who have shared political power on clan basis and enjoy relative peace and building state institutions fairly successfully.
Muhyadin: In Somalia, all conflicts are said to be based on poverty insomehow, what ways do you see to lift Somalia out of poverty so that militias and piracy are not attractive?
Prof Baadiyoow: The Somali problem is not a lack of resources and potential richness of the country. The country has abundant livestock, agricultural product and marine resources. It has mineral and oil reserves that await exploration. However, it is the lack of development which caused abject poverty. It is man-made poverty. This poverty could be not alleviated without effective state institutions and community participation. It also requires strong international assistance. Until law is returned to Somalia any cosmetic interventions will not solve the problem.
Muhyadin: What is your view towards federalism? Is federalism suitable to Somalia?
Prof Baadiyow: Federalism is a catchy word that is present in Somali conferences and discussions. Many Somalis disagree over its advantages and disadvantages. Its supporters believe that it brings one structural solution for Somalia while its opponents articulate it is a recipe for dissolution and disintegration of Somalia. However, I think, the problem of Somalia is not the structure of the state as such. If Somalia adopts centralism or federalism, the challenge of good governance remains the core problem. In this critical moment of Somalia, let the Somalis try federalism to accommodate many communities who are otherwise will not be satisfied in any other state structure.