Such fears that the intervention, known as Operation Linda Nchi (Defend the Nation), might end as badly as previous military operations in Somalia by Ethiopia and the United States are widespread.
“As it seems, it will end in retreat and failure,” said Ibrahim Sheikh Hassan, a professor in political science and strategy in Mogadishu.
Prof. Ibrahim notes that the history of foreign military intervention in Somalia – such as the UN and US action in the 1990s and Ethiopia’s ill-fated invasion in 2006 - is universally bad.
“Every foreign army who entered Somalia has left behind a situation worse than the one they sought to improve,” he said. “They fail in both their own interests and those of the Somali people.”
Five years ago, Ethiopia said its sovereignty and security is non-negotiable after it was threatened by Somali militias, but two years after invading it withdrew without attaining its goals. Instead, all it managed was to unite the Somali population behind al-Shabaab during its occupation. Thousands of Ethiopian troops with far more experience than Kenya failed.
Prof Ibrahim’s big question is how Kenya ignored the lessons of the past.
“They didn’t do proper research about intervention in Somalia,” he said. “It is ill-advised to attack al-Shabaab with such few soldiers.”
In late 2006, when Ethiopia began its war against the Islamic Courts Union, the precursor of the al-Shabaab, it ousted them quickly and the group’s leaders went into exile, giving energy to ICU’s wing of al-Shabaa. Ethiopian troops were never secure during a two-year occupation and eventually withdrew in early 2009 with Somalia more unstable than before the intervention. As Ethiopia did in 2006, Kenya’s army can easily push the militants in the beginning, but the end the war will be turn into guerrilla style and that will be where the Kenya army will fail, according to Prof Ibrahim Sheikh Hassan. Somalia has not had an effective government since armed warlords overthrew longtime military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991. Since then, the country has been an open space for different armed groups.
The best-known failed operation is the one US carried out to capture warlord Gen. Mohamed Farah, known as Aidid, in 1993. While the initial operation to secure humanitarian aid went well, the later intervention went badly wrong. Two US helicopters were brought down and 18 servicemen killed. The bodies of US soldiers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, forcing the US to withdraw.
Former chief of the Somalia Appeals Court and author Ahmed Sheikh Ali worries that Kenya’s intervention may give new energy to the Islamist militants.
“Al-Shabaab has continuously become weaker for the past two years,” he said. “The worry is that Kenya’s invasion might help them recruit new blood, as happened after Ethiopia’s invasion in 2006.”
Ali, who is also a traditional elder from regions Kenya wants to meld into the semi-autonomous Azania as a buffer zone, said that the operation might also fail if Kenya shows favoritism to certain clans rather than giving equal respect and appreciation.
He said foreign interventions are not welcomed by Somalis, and Kenya’s interference could unite al-Shabaab and marginalized clans.
“How long will Kenya’s army remain in Somalia? Such issues need to be addressed now otherwise the suspicion will rise,” he said.